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CALIFORNIA BANK & TRUST V. LAWLOR: A 
MORE CERTAIN FUTURE FOR 
CALIFORNIA’S SHAM GUARANTEE DEFENSE 
Brett D. Young∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
During the Great Depression, California enacted a series of 
statutes, known as the antideficiency statutes, designed to protect 
borrowers from aggressive bank actions in collecting debts.1 
California Code of Civil Procedure sections 580b through 580d are 
part of this statutory scheme and prevent deficiency judgments 
against borrowers when certain conditions are met.2 A potential 
“sham” guarantee arises when the primary obligor on the loan is also 
the guarantor.3 This sometimes occurs when the primary obligor and 
the guarantor in the transaction are the same entity. When the 
guarantee is later determined to be a sham, usually after a nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale, the lender is prevented from seeking a deficiency 
judgment against both the guarantor and the obligor because they are 
the same party, and thus, both are protected by section 580d.4 By 
∗  J.D. Loyola Law School, May 2015; B.A. History and Psychology, University of
California, Santa Barbara, June 2012. I would like to thank Professor Dan Schechter for his 
unwavering guidance, support, and passion for teaching. This Comment would not be possible 
without the hard work and dedication of the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review, and I owe them many thanks. Finally, I would be remiss not to thank my grandmother, 
who believed in me and instilled in me an insatiable thirst for learning.  
1. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Barton, 789 F. Supp. 1043, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 1992)
(citation omitted). 
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 580b,580d (West 2012), amended by 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv.
Ch. 71 (West) (S.B. 1304); id. § 580c. 1 MILLER & STARR CAL. REAL EST. DIGEST Deeds of 
Trust § 45 (3d ed. 2014). “If the security is insufficient, the creditor’s right to a judgment against 
the debtor for the deficiency may be limited or barred by Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580a, 580b, 580d, 
or 726.” Id. 
3. Id. “The sham guaranty defense arises from the concept that that a borrower cannot also
be the guarantor of its own debt.” Eric J. Rans & David J. Williams, A Lender’s Guide for 
Avoiding Sham Guaranty Claims—The Devil Is in the Details, 128 BANKING L.J. 483, 485 
(2011). 
4. River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 801 (Ct. App. 1995).
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successfully asserting this sham guarantee defense, guarantors are 
able to avoid personal liability despite the promises in the guarantee. 
California courts and the state legislature have treated this 
defense inconsistently. The combined failure of the state legislature 
and courts to articulate a clear-cut rule has created chaos in the 
application of the sham guarantee defense. In the recent California 
case of California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor,5 the California appellate 
court’s analysis of the sham guarantee defense moved California 
toward a more definitive approach to determine when a guarantee is 
a sham.6 The court limited the defense’s use to situations where a 
true sham was present, and eliminated the possibility a business 
owner could escape liability for a self-created sham. 
This Comment addresses the problematic use of the sham 
guarantee defense by guarantors and argues that courts should follow 
the recent Lawlor decision. Part II details the court’s decision in 
Lawlor. Part III explains the inconsistent application of the sham 
guarantee defense through an assessment of three important 
California cases. Part IV assesses the importance of the Lawlor 
court’s limitation of the application of the sham guarantee defense to 
true sham situations. Furthermore, this part argues that the Lawlor 
decision will help future lenders avoid lending to potential sham 
guarantors. Finally, Part V concludes that the court’s ruling, while 
unfavorable toward guarantors, creates necessary precedent for 
lenders. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In December 2004, Alliance loaned approximately $2 million to 
Cartwright Properties, LLC (“Cartwright”), a limited liability 
company formed by Jerry Smith, Smith’s wife, and David Lawlor 
(collectively, “Defendants”).7 Alliance subsequently made a second 
5. 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38 (Ct. App. 2013), as modified (Dec. 20, 2013).
6. See generally id. at 48. The court stated that to determine the existence of a sham
guaranty, the court must look to the “parties’ agreement to determine whether the guaranties 
constitute an attempt to circumvent the antideficiency law and recover deficiency judgments 
when those judgments otherwise would be prohibited.” Id. (citations omitted). “This requires [the 
court] to examine whether the legal relationship between the guarantor and the purported primary 
obligor truly separated the guarantor from the principal underlying obligation, and whether the 
lender required or structured the transaction in a manner designed to cast a primary obligor in the 
appearance of a guarantor.” Id. 
7. Id. at 40.
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loan to Cartwright in October 2006.8 In exchange, Cartwright signed 
promissory notes and gave Alliance trust deeds in Cartwright’s office 
building as security for the loan.9 Additionally, Alliance required 
Defendants to execute commercial guarantees for the loans.10 
Defendants were involved in other transactions with Bank. 
Smith and Lawlor also owned Covenant Management (“Covenant”), 
which was the general partner of two business entities collectively 
labeled by the court as Heritage Orcas.11 Heritage Orcas obtained a 
loan from Alliance for approximately $10.5 million in June 2008 in 
exchange for a promissory note and deeds of trust in two properties 
owned by Heritage Orcas.12 Smith, Lawlor, Covenant, and another 
company owned by Smith and Lawlor executed a continuing 
guaranty on the loans.13 
California Bank & Trust (the “Bank”) came into possession of 
the notes and deeds of trust in 2009.14 After Heritage Orcas and 
Cartwright defaulted on the loans, the Bank elected to foreclose on 
the properties and enforce the commercial guarantees signed by 
Defendants.15 The Bank purchased both properties at nonjudicial 
foreclosure sales for partial-credit bids.16 The outstanding balance on 
the loans totaled approximately $15 million.17 
The Bank subsequently filed motions for summary judgment on 
its breach of guaranty claims in order to obtain deficiency judgments 
against Defendants in their roles as guarantors.18 In order to avoid 
liability, Defendants argued that the guarantee was a sham because 
they were actually the primary obligors on the loans and not true 
guarantors.19 The trial court refused to allow Defendants to use the 
sham defense because they had not raised it affirmatively in their 
answer.20 
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 40–41.
11. Id. at 40.
12. Id. at 41.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
1228 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1225 
Defendants appealed the trial court’s action, and once again 
sought protection under California’s antideficiency statutes as sham 
guarantors.21 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
grant the summary judgment.22 However, the appellate court also 
stated that there was no evidence the guarantees were actually a 
sham.23 The court found that there was sufficient legal separation 
between Defendants’ business entities and the Defendants as 
individuals so as to not qualify the guarantees as shams.24 
III. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: COMPARING CALIFORNIA COURTS’
TREATMENT OF SHAM GUARANTEES
Sham guarantee defense cases have troubled California courts
for decades. A brief analysis of three relevant cases will highlight the 
courts’ inconsistencies when faced with sham guarantees. Torrey 
Pines Bank v. Hoffman25 sets the legal standard courts have struggled 
to apply when facing a possible sham guarantee while River Bank 
America v. Diller26 and Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner27 provide 
conflicting precedent for California courts to comply with. 
A. Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman
Torrey Pines Bank presents a perfect case study of how courts 
have traditionally applied the sham guarantee defense. Jerome and 
Naomi Joy Hoffman (the “Hoffmans”) purchased a parcel of 
property and received construction financing from Torrey Pines 
Bank to build a ninety-two-unit apartment complex.28 The borrower 
on the note was a revocable family trust in which the Hoffmans were 
the trustees and beneficiaries.29 The bank required the Hoffmans to 
personally guarantee the loan.30 The trust eventually defaulted on the 
loan, and the bank nonjudicially foreclosed on the property.31 The 
bank sought a deficiency judgment against the Hoffmans as the 
21. Id.
22. Id. at 40.
23. Id. at 48.
24. Id. at 49.
25. 282 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991).
26. River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
27. Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1964).
28. Torrey Pines, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 356–57.
29. Id. at 357.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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guarantors on the note.32 The trial court found for the Hoffmans on 
the theory that their guarantee was a sham, and the bank appealed.33 
The appellate court began its discussion by defining a guarantor 
as one who “promises to answer for the debt.”34 The court stated that 
a sham guarantee was designed to subvert California’s antideficiency 
laws by structuring the deal in a way that made the primary obligor 
liable for deficiency judgments.35 The court held that there was not 
sufficient legal separation between the trust, as the primary obligor, 
and the Hoffmans, as guarantors, because the paperwork and 
financial information presented to the bank on behalf of the trust as 
the borrower and the Hoffmans as guarantors was “substantially the 
same.”36 On these facts the court found that the guarantor and obligor 
were similar, if not identical, creating a sham guarantee.37 
B. Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner
In Valinda, a court of appeal muddied the water surrounding 
California’s sham guarantee defense. The defendants in Valinda 
purchased land from Valinda Builders, Inc. (“Valinda”) as 
individuals.38 The defendants later formed a corporation and, without 
the lenders consent, took title to the land in the name of the 
corporation.39 The corporation, not the individual defendants, issued 
the promissory note and deed of trust securing the property.40 The 
defendants as individuals then personally guaranteed the loan.41 
The appellate court held that the guarantee was a sham because 
the corporation was merely an instrument of the defendants.42 The 
court concluded that the defendants as individuals were always liable 
on the loan, regardless of whether the corporation was the primary 
obligor and a separate legal entity.43 Consequently, the court held 
there was not sufficient legal separation between the borrower and 
32. Id. at 358.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 360.
35. See id. at 361.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735, 735–36 (Ct. App. 1964).
39. Id. at 736.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 737.
43. Id.
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the guarantor to constitute a legitimate guarantee.44 The court stated, 
perhaps in dicta, that “one who contracts to buy land does not alter 
his identity and relation as purchaser by a purported guaranty of 
performance of his own obligation to pay the purchase price.”45 
Therefore, the guarantee was a sham and the defendants had no 
personal obligation on the loan.46 This is a clear departure from how 
courts had traditionally viewed the sham guarantee defense. 
C. River Bank America v. Diller
In River Bank, the appellate court took a position that was more 
favorable toward lenders.47 Sanford Diller and his wife were the sole 
trustees of the DNS trust, which owned all of the stock in 
Prometheus Development (“Prometheus”).48 Prometheus, with Diller 
as the principal officer, obtained construction loans for an apartment 
complex with River Bank America (“River Bank”).49 River Bank, as 
a condition of the loan, required Diller to use another limited 
partnership under his control to act as the borrower, and Diller to act 
as the guarantor on the loan.50 
After the primary obligor defaulted on the loan, River Bank 
nonjudicially foreclosed on the property.51 A deficiency of $12.9 
million was left after the property was sold, and River Bank 
commenced an action against Diller as the guarantor for a deficiency 
judgment.52 The trial court granted Diller’s motion for summary 
judgment, denying the enforcement of the guarantee.53 
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, the appellate court found 
that the loan’s financial structure created triable issues of fact 
concerning whether the sham guarantee defense applied.54 One can 
infer from the court’s holding that if the lender structured the deal to 
circumvent the antideficiency statutes, the guarantee would have 
44. See id.
45. Id. at 738.
46. See id.
47. See River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 (Ct. App. 1995).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 802.
51. Id. at 793.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 803.
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been deemed a sham and River Bank would not have recovered a 
deficiency judgment against Diller.55 
IV. ANALYSIS
The use, and sometimes abuse, of the sham defense is enshrined 
in California law. However, it is imperative that the courts properly 
apply the defense, and the split in California precedent hindered 
achievement of this goal. Lawlor resolved the uncertain standard 
presented by the conflicting precedents in Valinda and River Bank by 
holding the party responsible for the structure of the deal liable for 
their actions.56 
A. The Lawlor Decision Cripples Valinda
Initially the Lawlor holding appears unfair to guarantors because 
facially it substantially decreases the availability of the sham 
guarantee defense for borrowers.57 However, the purpose behind 
section 580d is to prevent lenders from having two means of 
recovery from the borrower as part of a nonjudicial foreclosure,58 the 
first being the security interest and the second being a deficiency 
judgment.59 Similarly, a borrower should not be able to sign up for a 
loan using a limited liability entity, blur the line between themselves 
and the entity creating a sham, and cleverly limit the lender’s 
recovery to the security interest. Both parties must abide by the 
antideficiency rules. 
Unfortunately, the court’s decision in Valinda did not create an 
equal playing field for lenders and borrowers. Although the Lawlor 
decision did not explicitly overturn Valinda, it rendered the Valinda 
holding impotent. The two rulings cannot coexist because Lawlor 
forces borrowers to personally accept the consequences of their 
business entity, whereas Valinda allows them to avoid personal 
liability.60 Under the holding in Lawlor, individuals cannot escape 
liability by guaranteeing a loan for their business entity and later 
55. Id.
56. See Cal. Bank & Trust v. Lawlor, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 48 (Ct. App. 2013), as modified
(Dec. 20, 2013). 
57. See id.
58. Rans & Williams, supra note 3, at, 485.
59. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 580b, 580d (West 2012), amended by 2014 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 71 (S.B. 1304) (West); id. § 580c. 
60. See id.
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claiming it was merely an instrument of the transaction.61 The 
Lawlor court unequivocally stated, “[i]ndividuals may structure their 
business dealings to limit their own personal liability, but they must 
accept the risks that accompany the benefits of incorporation.”62 This 
approach guts Valinda by setting forth the proposition that 
guarantors are effectively estopped from representing their business 
entity as a sham. 
While this holding seems to paralyze the use of the sham 
guarantee defense, in reality it has brought its use back within 
reason. Effectively, the court’s decision correctly prevents 
individuals from avoiding personal liability on their guarantee by 
creating a sham guarantee.63 A crafty borrower should not be able to 
simply form a limited liability entity to become the primary obligor 
on the loan in order to create a sham guarantee. The Lawlor court 
eliminated the potential for such manipulated shams by holding that 
individuals were estopped from denying the existence of their 
corporation.64 
The Lawlor holding will limit future guarantors’ use of the sham 
guarantee defense. The River Bank test for the sham guarantee 
defense is a very high standard that a guarantor will be unlikely to 
meet. This new standard is also important because it limits the use of 
the defense to situations involving an actual sham. 
B. The Future Effects of Lawlor’s Holding on Lenders
The Lawlor holding provides much needed guidance for lenders 
to properly structure deals to avoid a sham guarantee defense. 
Lenders, under the River Bank and Lawlor holdings, must be wary of 
too much involvement in the structure of the financial transaction. 
The combination of the River Bank decision with the new precedent 
in Lawlor will give lenders clearer guidance on what qualifies as a 
sham guarantee. The court will become suspicious of the structure of 
the deal if the lender requires the borrower to set up a borrowing 
business entity with the individual acting as the guarantor.65 
61. See Lawlor, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 49.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Rans & Williams, supra note 3, at 488.
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The Lawlor court’s decision protected creditors’ rights and 
eroded some of the expansive foundation for sham guarantee 
defenses that the Valinda court created. After River Bank and 
Valinda, the law became unfavorable toward lenders because it was 
unclear how the court would view their involvement in a financial 
transaction. Lawlor necessarily clarifies the standard by which 
lenders should conduct their business.66 The court of appeals made 
clear that had the original lender been involved in the structure of the 
deal, as was the case in River Bank, the outcome of its holding would 
have been different.67 The court provided that, “Defendants offered 
no evidence . . . that Alliance attempted to separate Defendant’s 
interest in the loans by making Cartwright Properties and Heritage 
Orcas the borrowers while relegating Defendants to the position of 
guarantors.”68 The court’s decision in this case importantly affirmed 
both the holding and the standard for approaching sham guarantees 
presented in River Bank.69 
Significantly, the court in Lawlor strictly interpreted the holding 
in River Bank.70 In order to satisfy the standard set forth in River 
Bank, and reaffirmed by Lawlor, a party pleading the sham guarantee 
defense must show that the lender “requested, required, or otherwise 
had any involvement in selecting the entities, or the form of the 
entities, that were the borrowers and primary obligors.”71 In Lawlor, 
the court rejected wholesale the defendants’ argument that their 
guarantee was a sham because the defendants created the 
corporation, and consequently, the necessary legal separation for a 
valid guarantee.72 The Lawlor court’s holding demands that the 
lender have a role in either forming or requiring the formation of the 
entity that is allegedly a sham obligor.73 Pursuant to the River Bank 
and Lawlor holdings, a lender would have to dominate the structure 
of the deal for a sham guarantee defense to become a possibility.74 
66. Lawlor, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 49.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 48.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 49.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.; River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 803 (Ct. App. 1995).
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In both River Bank and Lawlor, the court stated that the purpose 
of the transaction, specifically whether it was structured to 
circumvent section 580d, was the primary basis for reasoning a 
lender-driven transaction would constitute a sham.75 If lenders were 
permitted to circumvent the antideficiency legislation, guarantors in 
California would have no protection in lending transactions because 
lenders would have all the power in pursuing deficiency judgments. 
The Lawlor and River Bank courts correctly drew a line, preventing 
an over expansive grant of power to lenders. Indeed, the River Bank 
court found some evidence that the purpose of the lender-driven 
transaction was to permit recovery of deficiencies expressly 
forbidden by section 580d.76 
Finally, the Lawlor decision is so essential that the California 
Legislature should amend the Civil Code to codify the holding. A 
legislative amendment to California Civil Code section 2856 would 
create binding authority for all California courts to follow.77 Adding 
a subsection pertaining to the sham guarantee defense would 
essentially treat the sham guarantor’s actions as a waiver of 
protection under the antideficiency statutes. Without California 
Supreme Court authority, it is possible conflicting authority could 
continue to muddy the water surrounding the sham guarantee 
defense. A legislative amendment would protect Lawlor’s holding 
and provide a uniform application of the sham guarantee defense. 
V. CONCLUSION
Although California’s law on sham guarantees remains 
imperfect, the court’s decision in Lawlor has taken an important 
position on the application of California’s sham guarantee defense. 
By strictly interpreting the holding in River Bank, the court has 
provided much needed guidance to lenders in a troubled financial 
market. A lender controlling the structure of a financial transaction 
should not be permitted to circumvent the antideficiency statutes, and 
Lawlor and River Bank correctly prevented them from doing so. 
75. Cal. Bank & Trust v. Lawlor, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 48 (Ct. App. 2013), as modified
(Dec. 20, 2013); River Bank Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803. 
76. River Bank Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
77. California Civil Code section 2856 contains the statutory provisions pertaining to
guarantors and their ability to waive protection under the antideficiency statutes. CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 2856 (West 2012). Because Lawlor is only an appellate court decision, there is still no binding
authority statewide. An amendment to the statute would solve this problem.
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However, Lawlor also recognized that lenders need protection as 
well, and the court’s holding necessarily balances these competing 
interests. 
The sham guarantee defense remains a key part of California’s 
protection for borrowers and their guarantors. The Lawlor holding 
protects guarantors when their financial transaction truly involves a 
sham guarantee. But, the court’s holding, which limits the use of the 
defense, is necessary to prevent abuse by guarantors attempting to 
escape personal responsibility on their loan obligations. 
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